Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain
Zusammenfassung:
Between July 2023 and December 2024, Insikt Group observed the Chinese state-sponsored group RedDelta targeting Mongolia, Taiwan, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia with an adapted infection chain to distribute its customized PlugX backdoor. The group used lure documents themed around the 2024 Taiwanese presidential candidate Terry Gou, the Vietnamese National Holiday, flood protection in Mongolia, and meeting invitations, including an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting. RedDelta likely compromised the Mongolian Ministry of Defense in August 2024 and the Communist Party of Vietnam in November 2024. The group conducted spearphishing targeting the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, but Insikt Group observed no evidence of successful compromise. From September to December 2024, RedDelta likely targeted victims in Malaysia, Japan, the United States, Ethiopia, Brazil, Australia, and India.
In late 2023, RedDelta evolved the first stage of its infection chain to leverage a Windows Shortcut (LNK) file likely delivered via spearphishing. In 2024, the group transitioned to using Microsoft Management Console Snap-In Control (MSC) files. Most recently, RedDelta used spearphishing links to prompt a victim to load an HTML file remotely hosted on Microsoft Azure. Since July 2023, RedDelta has consistently used the Cloudflare content distribution network (CDN) to proxy command-and-control (C2) traffic, which enables the group to blend in with legitimate CDN traffic and complicates victim identification. Other state-sponsored groups, including Russia’s BlueAlpha, have similarly leveraged Cloudflare to evade detection.
RedDelta’s activities align with Chinese strategic priorities, focusing on governments and diplomatic organizations in Southeast Asia, Mongolia, and Europe. The group’s Asia-focused targeting in 2023 and 2024 represents a return to the group’s historical focus after targeting European organizations in 2022. RedDelta’s targeting of Mongolia and Taiwan is consistent with the group’s past targeting of groups seen as threats to the Chinese Communist Party’s power.
Über RedDelta:
RedDelta has been active since at least 2012 and has focused on targeting Southeast Asia and Mongolia. The group has routinely adapted its targeting in response to global geopolitical events. RedDelta targeted the Vatican and other Catholic organizations with PlugX before 2021 talks between China and the Vatican. The has group compromised law enforcement and government entities in India, a government organization in Indonesia, and other targets across Myanmar, Hong Kong, and Australia.
In 2022, RedDelta shifted toward increased targeting of European government and diplomatic entities following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This activity used an infection chain that began by delivering an archive file (ZIP, RAR, or ISO), which was likely delivered via spearphishing. The file contained a Windows Shortcut (LNK) file disguised with a double extension (such as .doc.lnk) and a Microsoft Word icon. Hidden folders within the archive contained three files used to complete dynamic-link library (DLL) search order hijacking: a legitimate binary, a malicious DLL loader, and an encrypted PlugX payload that was ultimately loaded into memory. User execution of the Shortcut file led to DLL search order hijacking. In November 2022, RedDelta evolved its tactics to stage the ISO file on a threat actor-controlled domain.
Im März 2023 identifizierte die Insikt Group RedDelta, das die Mongolei mit einer ähnlichen Infektionskette angriff, die mit einer Containerdatei (RAR, ZIP, ISO) begann, die eine LNK-Datei enthielt und eine DLL-Suchreihenfolge-Hijacking-Triade auslöste, die sich in einem versteckten verschachtelten Unterverzeichnis befand. Zu den Täuschungsdokumenten gehörten eine Einladung der Weltvereinigung der Mongolei und ein Dokument, das vorgab, ein BBC-Nachrichteninterview über den tibetischen Buddhismus und die Mongolei zu sein. RedDelta zielte ab auf:
- Mitglieder mehrerer mongolischer Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs), darunter eine Menschenrechts- und Pro-Demokratie-NGO, die sich auf die Autonome Region Innere Mongolei konzentriert
- Mongolian Buddhist activists in Mongolia and Japan
- Academic professionals in Mongolia and Japan
- Entwickler von zwei mongolischen mobilen Anwendungen
Mitigations:
Um RedDelta-Aktivitäten zu erkennen und einzudämmen, sollten Organisationen:
- Use YARA and Sigma rules provided by Insikt Group to detect RedDelta Windows Installer (MSI), DLL, and LNK files (see below).
- Configure intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and other network defense mechanisms to alert on or block connection attempts from external IP addresses and domains associated with RedDelta (see below).
- Keep software and applications — particularly operating systems, antivirus software, and core system utilities — up to date.
- Filtern Sie E-Mail-Korrespondenz und überprüfen Sie Anhänge auf Malware.
- Conduct regular system backups and store them offline and offsite to ensure they are inaccessible via the network.
- Adhere to strict compartmentalization of company-sensitive data, institute role-based access, and limit company-wide data access.
- Deploy client-based host logging and intrusion detection capabilities to identify and thwart attacks early.
- Prevent threat actors from bypassing security by disabling outdated authentication methods.
- Implement tools like network IDS, NetFlow collection, host logging, and web proxy, alongside manual monitoring of detection sources.
- Practice network segmentation and ensure special protections exist for sensitive information, such as multifactor authentication, and restricted accesss.
Leverage the Recorded Future® Third-Party Intelligence module and Threat Intelligence Browser Extension for real-time monitoring and prioritized vulnerability patching.
Review public guidance (1, 2, 3, 4) and Insikt Group’s “Charting China’s Climb as a Leading Global Cyber Power” report for comprehensive recommendations for mitigating Chinese advanced persistent threat activity more broadly.
Outlook:
Insikt Group anticipates that RedDelta will continue targeting organizations worldwide with its customized PlugX backdoor, focusing on Southeast Asia and China’s periphery, including Mongolia and Taiwan. Likely targets include governments, NGOs, activists, and religious organizations. RedDelta has continually evolved its infection chain and is anticipated to continue doing so in the future in response to major geopolitical developments.
Um die gesamte Analyse zu lesen, klicken Sie hier, um den Bericht als PDF herunterzuladen.
Anhang A – Indikatoren für eine Gefährdung
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Domänen: abecopiers[.]com alicevivianny[.]com aljazddra[.]com alphadawgrecords[.]com alvinclayman[.]com antioxidantsnews[.]com armzrace[.]com artbykathrynmorin[.]com atasensors[.]com bkller[.]com bonuscuk[.]com bramjtop[.]com buyinginfo[.]org calgarycarfinancing[.]com comparetextbook[.]com conflictaslesson[.]com councilofwizards[.]com crappienews[.]com createcopilot[.]com cuanhuaanbinh[.]com dmfarmnews[.]com electrictulsa[.]com elevateecom[.]com epsross[.]com erpdown[.]com estmongolia[.]com financialextremed[.]com finasterideanswers[.]com flaworkcomp[.]com flfprlkgpppg[.]shop getfiledown[.]com getupdates[.]net glassdoog[.]org globaleyenews[.]com goclamdep[.]net goodrapp[.]com gulfesolutions[.]com hajjnewsbd[.]com hisnhershealthynhappy[.]com homeimageidea[.]com howtotopics[.]com importsmall[.]com indiinfo[.]com infotechtelecom[.]com inhller[.]com instalaymantiene[.]com iplanforamerica[.]com irprofiles[.]com itduniversity[.]com ivibers[.]com jorzineonline[.]com kelownahomerenovations[.]com kentscaffolders[.]com kerrvillehomeschoolers[.]com kxmmcdmnb[.]online lebohdc[.]com linkonmarketing[.]com loginge[.]com lokjopppkuimlpo[.]shop londonisthereason[.]com looksnews[.]com maineasce[.]com meetviberapi[.]com mexicoglobaluniversity[.]com mobilefiledownload[.]com mojhaloton[.]com mongolianshipregistrar[.]com mrytlebeachinfo[.]com myynzl[.]com newslandtoday[.]net normalverkehr[.]com nymsportsmen[.]com oncalltechnical[.]com onmnews[.]com pgfabrics[.]com pinaylizzie[.]com profilepimpz[.]com quickoffice360[.]com redactnews[.]com reformporta[.]com richwoodgrill[.]com riversidebreakingnews[.]com rpcgenetics[.]com sangkayrealnews[.]com shreyaninfotech[.]com smldatacenter[.]com spencerinfo[.]net starlightstar[.]com tasensors[.]com techoilproducts[.]com thelocaltribe[.]com tigermm[.]com tigernewsmedia[.]com tophooks[.]org truckingaccidentattorneyblog[.]com truff-evadee[.]com tychonews[.]com unixhonpo[.]com usedownload[.]com vanessalove[.]com versaillesinfo[.]com vopaklatinamerica[.]com windowsfiledownload[.]com xxmodkiufnsw[.]shop 365officemail[.]com 7gzi[.]com Additional Staging Domains https[:]//getfiledown[.]com/utdkt https[:]//versaillesinfo[.]com/brjwcabz https[:]//lifeyomi[.]com/trkziu https[:]//lebohdc[.]com/uleuodmm https[:]//cdn7s65[.]z13[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net https[:]//edupro4[.]z13[.]web[.]core[.]windows[.]net https[:]//elevateecom[.]com/deqcehfg https[:]//vabercoach[.]com/uenic https[:]//artbykathrynmorin[.]com/lczjnmum RedDelta Administration Servers 115.61.168[.]143 115.61.168[.]170 115.61.168[.]229 115.61.169[.]139 115.61.170[.]105 115.61.170[.]70 182.114.108[.]91 182.114.108[.]93 182.114.110[.]11 182.114.110[.]170 RedDelta C2 Servers (October–December 2024) 103.79.120[.]92 45.83.236[.]105 116.206.178[.]67 45.133.239[.]183 116.206.178[.]68 103.238.225[.]248 45.133.239[.]21 103.238.227[.]183 103.107.104[.]37 107.148.32[.]206 167.179.100[.]144 116.206.178[.]34 149.104.2[.]160 207.246.106[.]38 45.76.132[.]25 155.138.203[.]78 144.76.60[.]136 38.180.75[.]197 107.155.56[.]15 107.155.56[.]87 202.91.36[.]213 107.155.56[.]4 149.104.12[.]64 154.205.136[.]105 223.26.52[.]208 45.128.153[.]73 96.43.101[.]245 45.135.119[.]132 161.97.107[.]93 103.107.105[.]81 103.107.104[.]4 103.107.104[.]57 154.90.47[.]123 147.78.12[.]202 Shortcut (LNK) Files (SHA256) a0a3eeb6973f12fe61e6e90fe5fe8e406a8e00b31b1511a0dfe9a88109d0d129 2232cd249be265d092ea923452f82aae28f965b48897fe6f05a7cd4495fcd96e aaad74fbf1b3f499aa2be9f5a86f0d6427c2d807c27532090671295a2b5d67e0 6e37ad572f1e7d228c8c0c7cb1ef2d966d16d681669587cfb80e063106d77a6e 6ac4b0fd81e317615e0935e83874ef997b7bff3aff2f391405a2e22161f4fd45 dd2d8fb565b18065bde545da16f67f31036b4d45dec5b82caa74e30a617e85e8 945f7ca6ce890f6cd1813b0ed1912ef25ed4a5f11da0fe97c20fe443bd4489a1 042045687882ec8dc2d61e26e86e56620c4a1e694b46f9ce814b060cb0cf4bb5 5479927c78faed415853c3ba3798dfff93d4047a17c3c4d87f7dc1ce8289395c d8981d4cbca9b99828a9459e4abfbbe20a221bfc59fc0f2a6d6a751c363b26c4 c6bd2c31ebaa8d51964c49a22bc796aa506e594d6f1b1043b01d0baf58836172 df3e5c62fa7086eec23c04cb52a17d64aa0b4f252551c8a65c599291a7cee61f 2c791775e66a77fe72aa826823f554bfe9a41525c6c1c14798cf56a42925db31 74f3101e869cedb3fc6608baa21f91290bb3db41c4260efe86f9aeb7279f18a1 MSC files (SHA256) 1cbf860e99dcd2594a9de3c616ee86c894d85145bc42e55f4fed3a31ef7c2292 (Meeting_Invitation.msc) 54549745868b27f5e533a99b3c10f29bc5504d01bd0792568f2ad1569625b1fd (240422 264-24 SOLO airfield surveys.msc) 8c9e1f17e82369d857e5bf3c41f0609b1e75fd5a4080634bc8ae7291ebe2186c (Meeting Invitation.msc) d0c4eb52ea0041cab5d9e1aea17e0fe8a588879a03415f609b195cfbd69caafc (Meeting.msc) ca0dfda9a329f5729b3ca07c6578b3b6560e7cfaeff8d988d1fe8c9ca6896da5 (Meeting invitation.msc) 6784b646378c650a86ba4fdd4baaaf608e5ecdf171c71bb7720f83965cc8c96f (Meeting.msc) 00619a5312d6957248bac777c44c0e9dd871950c6785830695c51184217a1437 (Pg 151 vv nghi le Quoc khanh 2.9.msc) eae187a91f97838dbb327b684d6a954beee49f522a829a1b51c1621218039040 (BCTT 02.9 AM Final.docx.msc) c1f27bed733c5bcf76d2e37e1f905d6c4e7abaeb0ea8975fca2d300c19c5e84f (ADSOM-Plus - Meeting Programme.msc) 397afb74746b2fe01abc63789412b38f44ceb234a278a04b85b2bb5b4e64cc8c (Meeting Invitation.msc) 49abaa2ba33af3ebde62af1979ed7a4429866f4f708e0d8e9cfffcfa7a279604 (Meeting Procedure.msc) 3e6772aca8bb8e71956349f1ea9fecda5d9b9cfa00f8cdbf846c169ab468a370 (Meeting request.msc) f0aa5a27ea01362dce9ced3685961d599e1c9203eef171b76c855a3db41f1ec6 (Шуурхай мэдээ 2024-05-27 -.msc) e81982e40ee5aaed85817343464d621179a311855ca7bcc514d70f47ed5a2c67 (Meeting Invitation.msc) MSI files (SHA256) 471e61015ff18349f4bf357447597a54579839336188d98d299b14cff458d132 7c741c8bcd19990140f3fa4aa95bb195929c9429fc47f95cf4ab9fad03040f7b 1efe366230043521c1f55cc049117a65acd1a29f4470446ad277f57c4f3a2feb 7a2994a6b61ee8ac668e41e622edfa7ae7e06b66d80c2a535f5822bc98058c33 364f38b48565814b576f482c1e0eb4c8d58effcd033fd45136ee00640a2b5321 d4b9f7c167bc69471baf9e18afd924cf9583b12eee0f088c98abfc55efd77617 dbe26b8c3a75f2a78e1a47e021e5ed0087dd8433a667ab8238385529239f108e 71e462aaca0f2d8c8a685756b070d017c796de6ac22021a79d922f2f182d4fb0 2d884fd8cfa585adec7407059064672d06a6f4bdc28cf4893c01262ef15ddb99 30fbf917d0a510b8dac3bacb0f4948f9d55bbfb0fa960b07f0af20ba4f18fc19 2cd4fb94268ba063b1a5eea7fe87e794fecf46c0f56c2aaa81e8c9052bb4f5f2 (Adobe-Setup.msi) 38b2852a8dfadac620351c7bea674c29cc5aa89d051fb7acfb8d550df00d4403 34e915d93b541471a9f7e747303f456732cd48c52e91ef268e32119ea8c433c0 507aa944d77806b3f24a3337729b52168808e8d469e5253cbf889cdaabb5254e 976ffe00ca06a4e3d2482815c2770086e7283025eeecad0a750001dedaa2d16a 2cd4fb94268ba063b1a5eea7fe87e794fecf46c0f56c2aaa81e8c9052bb4f5f2 c7ec098093eb08d2b36d1c37b928d716d8da021f93319a093808a7ceb3b35dc1 c2d259056163788dce3a98562bb3bcba3a57a23854104e58a8d0fe18200d690b 62adbe84f0f19e897df4e0573fc048272e0b537d5b34f811162b8526b9afaf32 (Adobe-Setup.msi) DLL files (SHA256) 67c23db357588489031700ea8c7dc502a6081d7d1a620c03b82a8f281aa6bde6 b6f375d8e75c438d63c8be429ab3b6608f1adcd233c0cc939082a6d7371c09bb a7735182b7f9f2c10af3f8d2d10634c344d984f6e53e7a3787e4d3d756a7a0a0 53bafcf064d421341c582d93108e84df2f0e284c2b0a4dc2deb9099aa953bf5a 7a16ba2f0d2c4f7779b67e41f8196ddc6652ca7b61607696ed154df83c8d7b9c 749d8980d80966480c85c112a10e1be3d391c1f4673977e880fa461edc2cbf18 2220a9297876d7ffb5ad8da4d35ed7b2c8746129f66056e81c4f74a6bb224fd7 3ced0837225b635f2ed63e4f72f95933d804e089a21eb8022407a74d772bb94f f1f58fda25e2a6dde9cab4faf02f7246d2a8ab2c96b4b055deea4093eee9d0e6 77f813a461b4f1f1c765d951f0bf04668d96efea72cb8ecfb594ea2e36153cf8 dc155cb86f5240c2c39c851e006e39cb33ed9b52e0633cbcdcc2164a47a93e22 5400fda058d7a13c27e9c95453634e4fee9a421023e0d4482f3eacc198caa928 367a98647dea14345e258bc01dfb77b46d1a895e91b5d088cf949de34db13f59 f1812ca5170af2401d501561d2a3036379752d22111b10f9ac570587364c82aa e1c85c49982339770189f7947b5bfeb926bc3e4e1d1c63655cb0f8cfdc82a647 f2b04c3c764c85c0bedb434b55304d26d067662cd47e620e219657a0007c9fe0 c25b3a3d7779cb89772454a756ce48ed3744cf233564d309b6f8d19bd8e26fa4 (hid.dll) 1bde2b050117d7f27e55a71b4795476decace1850587a17d6cf6fd3fc030ff1a (hid.dll) 73451742de056d3d06f7c42904651439198df449115f7adb08601b8104bec6fb (hid.dll) 651c096cf7043a01d939dff9ba58e4d69f15b2244c71b43bedb4ada8c37e8859 (msi.dll) f8c1a4c3060bc139d8ac9ad88d2632d40a96a87d58aba7862f35a396a18f42e5 (msi.dll) 288e79407daae7ae9483ef789d035d464cf878a611db453675ba1a2f6beb1a03 (FormDll.dll) ee9c935adae0d830cdc0fccd12b19c32be4f15dffcf454a9d807016ce59ff9a9 c5aa22163eb302ef72c553015ae78f1efe79e0167acad10047b0b25844087205 (hid.dll) 1a37289c70c78697b85937ae4e1e8a4cebb7972c731aceaef2813e241217f009 (hid.dll) 49c32f39d420b836a2850401c134fece4946f440c535d4813362948c2de3996f (hid.dll) 83946986b28fd8d04d59bab994cd2dc48e83b9711a8f453d8364c2ad27ea0254 (hid.dll) ade0b5cfedfa73252ec72deee7eb79e26380e2e50b47efcfe12350c9a255bb66 (hid.dll) b63f51537957572c43c26fc8e9088361978ee901df4b8e67d48843c4fb7c027b (hid.dll) 557f04c6ab6f06e11032b25bd3989209de90de898d145b2d3a56e3c9f354d884 Encrypted Payloads (DAT) (SHA256) 095855cf6c82ae662cce34294f0969ca8c9df266736105c0297d2913a9237dd1 abd5a09ec75ff36df87ece894cab441ef7f021f5bdd8ba55d00b8ed8aac03ab4 7b8dbfe66d16ad627d3864bd5d396b98a86c75aa4a3d87067a03221d73a560c1 52ba1bd4d40202c24cb896a355f094dbe0dc6e211f5ddd5b59f0c39b99203172 b02b2c0a9209f20dab4efbc458160f5a9efdb81b6474ec10bb727295a86d825a 7f382a8b19613d078e4b78b677cb7592cab7c17577638e7ecad0a4952c6f4055 aafff72a8c4ad7be37b25e3686a28a11f1d29a0acc771cac1974e17c176c5ed1 16dd782942b25aa2eb61bc7de36820444b9f55846c815e249a942b52c61be6b5 d674025113d350438a11439d56db111881de887fea41b2d168c6c2b8d8c22014 ca963057e69914d7e6c40aa7c43b393a1516f6dfdd2abfed12ddaa21fc2cfcce 96085a217f0841bae3fe77ecf60785a5cf4051748e90c818cf6160f7fd00b12e bde73773529ec32161fb8a675b50678771bf317a83f3dd8d0c47f54bdc665722 94ad60e87518ac2f655be1b0297e0109da3ef0ae733357206e3e87712c5dfba7 908ff3a80ef065ab4be1942e0d41583903f6aac02d97df6b4a92a07a633397a8 (NoteLogger.dat) a5cd617434e8d0e8ae25b961830113cba7308c2f1ff274f09247de8ed74cac4f (NoteLogger.dat) 4ac2a633904b0da3ac471776ecbaded91e1f3a5107630fafde76868cace46051 (inkformDB.dat) 75e849cc96c573fdfe0233b4d9a79c17fb4c40f15c0b6c0d847c461a30f1cbe8 d188e877066f0932440d4cd8e8e2e856d7b92d40b475b7c0f0c996b34a2847a4 (LDevice.dat) 37c7bdac64e279dc421de8f8a364db1e9fd1dcca3a6c1d33df890c1da7573e9f (LDevice.dat) 6e07e37618f57ac1930865e175d49ef1bf85aa882ffbd30538f55f64d024085b (LDevice.dat) 58a73d445f6122c921092001b132460bb6c1601dc93ecfaabe5df2bf0fef84de (LDevice.dat) 9afddc7ff0a75975748e5dc7d81eee8cd32be79ca32edfebd151a376563e7d4b (LDevice.dat) 9333cc552193cfe9122515e3d7b210de317c297f1c09da5180b3a7f006d94fe4 (LDevice.dat) 3552708726f50ee949656e66a4a10da304bae088fa1b875bfab9e182b6ec97f7 (LDevice (3).dat) 5dae5254493df246c15e52fd246855a5d0a248f36925cecee141348112776275 (officeime.dat) Legitimate Executables (SHA256) b9836265c6bfa17cd5e0265f32cedb1ced3b98e85990d000dc8e1298d5d25f93 (ONENOTEM.exe) 87d0abc1c305f7ce8e98dc86712f841dd491dfda1c1fba42a70d97a84c5a9c70 (inkform.exe) d27c5d38c2f3e589105c797b6590116d3ec58ad0d2b998d2ea92af67b07c76b1 (ExcelRepairToolboxLauncher.exe) 282fc12e4f36b6e2558f5dd33320385f41e72d3a90d0d3777a31ef1ba40722d6 (LDeviceDetectionHelper.exe) 80a7ff01de553cb099452cb9fac5762caf96c0c3cd9c5ad229739da7f2a2ca72 (imecmnt.exe) HTML files (SHA256) 0b152012c1deab39c6ed7fe75a27168eaaec43ae025ee74d35c2fee2651b8902 0c7ee8667f48c50ea68c9ad02880f0ff141a3279bd000502038a3a187c7d1ede File Paths C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\GkyOpucv\ C:\Users\Public\SecurityScan\ C:\Users\Public\.vsCodes\ C:\ProgramData\.vscodes\ C:\Users\< USER >\AppData\Local\MUxPOTy\ C:\ProgramData\SamsungDriver\ C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\.inkform\inkformDB.dat C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\VirtualFile\inkform.exe C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\VirtualFile\FormDll.dll C:\Users\Public\.inkform\inkformDB.dat C:\Users\Public\Intelnet\FormDll.dll C:\Users\Public\Intelnet\inkform.exe C:\Users\Public\.inkform\inkformDB.dat C:\Users\Public\SecurityScan\FormDll.dll C:\Users\Public\SecurityScan\inkform.exe C:\ProgramData\.inkform\inkformDB.dat C:\ProgramData\Intelnet\FormDll.dll C:\ProgramData\Intelnet\inkform.exe C:\Users\Admin\.inkform\inkformDB.dat C:\Users\Admin\SamsungDriver\inkform.exe C:\Users\Admin\SamsungDriver\FormDll.dll |
Anhang B – MITRE ATT&CK-Techniken
| Taktik: Technik | ATT&CK-Code |
| Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure — Virtual Private Server | T1583.003 |
| Ressourcenentwicklung: Infrastruktur erwerben — Domains | T1583.001 |
| Erster Zugriff: Phishing – Spearphishing-Anhang | T1566.001 |
| Erster Zugriff: Phishing – Spearphishing-Link | T1566.002 |
| Ausführung: CUser-Ausführung – Bösartige Datei | T1204.002 |
| Ausführung: Befehls- und Skriptinterpreter — PowerShell | T1059.001 |
| Persistenz: Boot- oder Anmelde-Autostart-Ausführung — Registry Run Keys / Startup-Ordner | T1547.001 |
| Umgehung der Verteidigung: Hijack-Ausführungsfluss — DLL-Suchreihenfolge-Hijacking | T1574.001 |
| Defense Evasion: Execution Guardrails — Geofencing | T1627.001 |
| Umgehung der Verteidigung: Dateien oder Informationen entschlüsseln/dekodieren | T1140 |
| Umgehung der Verteidigung: Ausführung eines System-Binär-Proxys — MMC | T1071.001 |
| Umgehung der Verteidigung: Ausführung eines System-Binär-Proxys — Msiexec | T1218.007 |
| Defense Evasion: Masquerading — Match Legitimate Name or Location | T1036.005 |
| Umgehung der Verteidigung: Verschleierung — Doppelte Dateierweiterung | T1036.007 |
| Erkennung: Erkennung von Systeminformationen | T1082 |
| Befehls- und Kontrollsystem: Verschlüsselter Kanal — Symmetrische Kryptografie | T1573.001 |
| Befehls- und Kontrollsystem: Datenkodierung: Standardkodierung | T1132.001 |
| Befehls- und Kontrollsystem: Webdienst | T1102 |
Anhang C — YARA- und Sigma-Regeln
|
Sigma-Regel zur Erkennung von RedDelta-DLL-Hijacking-Versuchen, PlugX zu laden: title: Potential RedDelta APT DLL Hijacking Attempt id: a8535c40-4e04-4ff6-baea-479ea6b0adea status: stable description: Detects DLL potential hijacking of LDeviceDetectionHelper.exe in a subdirectory of AppData\Local. Used by RedDelta APT to load PlugX. author: MGUT, Insikt Group, Recorded Future date: 2024/09/06 references:
tags: - attack.t1574.001 # Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: image_start: Image|startswith: - 'C:\Users\' image_end: Image|endswith: - '\AppData\Local\*\LDeviceDetectionHelper.exe' condition: image_start und image_end level: critical falsepositives: - Unwahrscheinlich
YARA-Regel zur Erkennung von in NIM geschriebenen RedDelta-Loadern: import "pe"
rule APT_CN_RedDelta_Nim_Loader_DEC23 { meta: author = "JGrosfelt, Insikt Group, Recorded Future" date = "2023-12-21" description = "Detects RedDelta RC4 Implementation in Nim Loaders" version = "1.0" RF_THREATACTOR = "RedDelta" RF_THREATACTOR_ID = "en_T6N"
strings:
/* RedDelta Custom RC4 Implementierung (von RC4) 8B 8D E0 FB FF FF mov ecx, [ebp+var_420] 89 F2 mov edx, esi 32 54 3B 08 xor dl, [ebx+edi+8] 0F BE D2 movsx edx, dl E8 E7 C5 FF FF call sub_6DB03E5C 89 85 E0 FB FF FF mov [ebp+var_420], eax 89 F8 mov eax, edi 83 C0 01 add eax, 1 89 C7 mov edi, eax 0F 81 8E FE FF FF jno loc_6DB07716 */ $s1 = { 8B 8D E0 FB FF FF 89 F2 32 54 3B 08 0F BE D2 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 85 E0 FB FF FF 89 F8 83 C0 01 89 C7 0F }
condition: (uint16 (0) == 0x5a4d) und $s1 }
rule APT_CN_RedDelta_Nim_Loader_Aug24 { meta: author = "MGUT, Insikt Group, Recorded Future" date = "2024-09-06" description = "Erkennt RedDelta MSI-Dateien, die zum Laden von PlugX über DLL-Hijacking verwendet werden" version = "1.0" hash = "49c32f39d420b836a2850401c134fece4946f440c535d4813362948c2de3996f" hash = "c5aa22163eb302ef72c553015ae78f1efe79e0167acad10047b0b25844087205" RF_THREATACTOR = "RedDelta" RF_THREATACTOR_ID = "en_T6N"
strings: $func = "winimConverterVarObjectToPtrObject" condition: uint16be(0) == 0x4d5a und Dateigröße < 500KB and pe.number_of_exports == 2 and pe.exports("HidD_GetHidGuid") and pe.exports("NimMain") and $func }
YARA rule to detect MSI executables used to load PlugX: rule APT_CN_RedDelta_MSI_Aug24 { meta: author = "MGUT, Insikt Group, Recorded Future" date = "2024-09-06" description = "Erkennt RedDelta MSI-Dateien, die zum Laden von PlugX über DLL-Hijacking verwendet werden" version = "1.0" hash = "30fbf917d0a510b8dac3bacb0f4948f9d55bbfb0fa960b07f0af20ba4f18fc19" hash = "2d884fd8cfa585adec7407059064672d06a6f4bdc28cf4893c01262ef15ddb99" RF_THREATACTOR = "RedDelta" RF_THREATACTOR_ID = "en_T6N"
strings: $s1 = "TARGETDIR[%LOCALAPPDATA]" $s2 = "\\LDeviceDetectionHelper.exe" $s3 = "hid.dll" condition: uint32be(0) == 0xd0cf11e0 and all of them }
YARA-Regel zur Erkennung von LNK-Dateien, die zum Laden von PlugX verwendet werden (gilt für die Infektionskette ab 2023): rule APT_CN_RedDelta_LNK_Oct23 { meta: author = "Mkelly, Insikt Group, Recorded Future" date = "2023-10-13" description = "Detects RedDelta LNK files used to retrieve and install .msi files via Powershell" version = "1.0" hash = "a0a3eeb6973f12fe61e6e90fe5fe8e406a8e00b31b1511a0dfe9a88109d0d129" hash = "74f3101e869cedb3fc6608baa21f91290bb3db41c4260efe86f9aeb7279f18a1" RF_THREATACTOR = "RedDelta" RF_THREATACTOR_ID = "en_T6N"
strings: $s1 = "install.InstallProduct" wide $s2 = "install=New-Object" wide $s3 = "install.uilevel = 2" wide $s4 = "REMOVE=ALL" wide
condition: uint16(0) == 0x004c und Dateigröße < 5MB and 3 of them } |
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